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This study’s aim is to improve the forecasting of civil war and examine 
the practical utility of using machine learning techniques in this effort. 
Specifically, this study investigates a variety of sampling methods used to 
construct useful models from imbalanced data, the algorithm used to construct 
these models, and which of the models built by previous scholars is the most 
useful for prediction when different sampling procedures algorithms are applied. 
This study finds that up-sampling and SMOTE sampling generally improve model 
performance, that tree-based ensemble methods generally perform significantly 
better than logistic regression and that of these ensemble methods Extreme 
Gradient Boosting generally performs the best, and that the previous model 
constructed by Collier & Hoeffler performs extremely well, especially when 
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The causes of civil war have been the subject of a great deal of scholarly 
debate of the last 15 years. Primarily beginning with the work of Paul Collier and 
Anke Hoeffler1 on economic motivations for intrastate violence and that of James 
Fearon and David Laitin2 on the role of state capacity in civil war outbreak, the 
area of most discussion has been whether or not economic or political motivations 
are the true cause of civil war. However, this debate has not focused on 
attempting to use their findings to forecast future wars or to test how well their 
findings would predict past conflicts, instead focusing entirely on using linear 
statistical models to find the most statistically significant predictors. This lack of 
focus on predictive power and use of explicitly linear models in an attempt to 
model a non-linear relationship has led to a large body of literature that is of 
limited utility to policy makers given its methodological flaws and high 
specificity3. In addition, the capabilities of new machine learning models have 
advanced significantly since the debate on the causes of civil war began, but for 
the most part scholars have been slow to begin utilizing these new methods. 
This study will attempt to address the weakness in the existing literature 
by utilizing predictive models in an attempt to forecast civil war, and testing 
                                                          
1 Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War." Oxford Economic Papers 
56, no. 4 (2004): 536.; See also Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler. "On the Economic Causes of 
Civil War." Oxford Economic Papers 50, no. 4 (1998), 563. 
2 James D. Fearon, and David D. Laitin. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." American 
Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003), 75. 
3 Michael D. Ward, Brian D. Greenhill, and Kristin M. Bakke. "The perils of policy by p-value: 
Predicting civil conflicts." Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 4 (2010), 363-375. 
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whether non-parametric tree-based models are better predictors of civil war than 
parametric methods such as logistic regression. It should be noted that there is a 
considerable difference between mathematical models used for explanations of a 
phenomenon and those used for prediction. The purpose of this study is not to 
craft a better explanation of civil war than Collier and Hoeffler or Fearon and 
Laitin, but to use the existing scholarship as a guide for crafting models that are 
better at predicting whether or not a civil war will occur. The use of machine 
learning to forecast whether or not a country may be about to descend into civil 
war is a powerful tool for policy makers and military leaders, and could be used 
as a means of concentrating efforts to prevent the predicted civil war from coming 
to fruition or to begin steps to mitigate the damage and end the war more quickly. 
As stated above, machine learning is a growing field which is beginning to 
make inroads into the study of politics and political phenomena. A fairly 
digestible definition of machine learning is the use of an algorithm that can 
recognize patterns without being explicitly programmed. A simple practical 
example might look something like this: a bank wants to know whether or not 
someone will default on a loan, but have too many loan applications to be 
processed by a human, and believe a computer might pick up patterns that a 
human would miss. To solve this problem, the bank uses an algorithm that will 
classify whether or not an applicant will default on their loan based on a variety of 
inputs such as age, credit score, employment status, and education. The bank will 
first train the model to spot patterns on observations with a known outcome, in 
this case loans that have been issued and were either paid back or went into 
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default. The bank will then use this trained algorithm to predict unseen data, and 
use its predictions as a guide for whether it should or should not issue the loan.  
There is a small and developing body of existing scholarship on the 
application of machine learning to the study of civil war456. Previous works have 
echoed the criticisms of existing scholarship that have been covered here. 
However, these works have been primarily driven by a single question, “Is 
machine learning capable of predicting civil war?”, and the findings have 
indicated a preliminary “yes”78. This study will go beyond that, and attempt to 
find the general type of algorithm which predicts civil wars best. The number of 
machine learning algorithms is large, and finding the ones which are capable of 
predicting such a complex phenomenon is an important task if this methodology 
is to be applied to the study of civil war. 
2. Literature Review 
The goal of this paper is to test different machine learning models for use 
in forecasting civil war outbreak. As a result, this literature review will cover two 
general bodies of political science literature; the body of work dealing with the 
causes of civil war and the work dealing with forecasting civil war with 
parametric and non-parametric machine learning techniques. The latter is still 
                                                          
4 Jack Goldstone, Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Ted Robert Gurr, Michael B. Lustik, Monty 
G. Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. "A global model for forecasting political 
instability." American Journal of Political Science 54, no. 1 (2010), 190. 
5 Chris Perry. "Machine Learning and Conflict Prevention: A Use Case." Stability: International 
Journal of Security and Development 2, no. 3 (2013), 1. 
6 David Muchlinski, David Siroky, Jingrui He, and Matthew Kocher. "Comparing random forest 
with logistic regression for predicting class-imbalanced civil war onset data." Political Analysis 
24, no. 1 (2015): 87. 
7 Perry, “Machine Learning”, 17-18. 
8 Muchlinski, “Comparing Random Forests”, 87. 
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very much a developing body of work, and tends to sit somewhere between the 
disciplines of political methodology and computer science. 
 The study of civil war outbreak has, for at least the least 13-15 years, been 
tightly focused around the fundamental question of whether political grievance 
against the controlling institution or the economic needs and desires of the rebel 
groups. This debate is typically labelled the “greed versus grievance” debate, in 
reference to the seminal article by Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in 
Civil War”9. This article, published in 2004, maintains that rebel greed, rather 
than political grievance, appears to be the primary cause of civil war. Examining 
civil wars from 1960-1999, the authors construct a series of logistic regression 
models to test whether greed or grievance based variables are better predictors. In 
their best fitting model, they find that the most significant predictor of whether a 
country will experience a civil war is primary commodity exports as a percentage 
of GDP. The authors conclude that this is a result of these exports providing a 
relatively easy means of financing the rebellion. Overall, the model they construct 
using only economic variables leads to a far better fit than the model constructed 
using only economic variables. It should be noted that the authors admit that 
political grievance variables, such as ethnic tension and political repression, are 
difficult to quantify. 
                                                          
9 Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance”, 563; See also Collier and Hoeffler, “On the 
Economic Causes”, 536. which covers similar topics and began a more in-depth discussion of 
economic motivations in civil war, although it is less influential. 
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 The findings of Goldstone et al in their 2010 paper run counter to the 
assertions of Collier and Hoeffler10. Goldstone et al find that four variables: 
regime type, infant mortality rate, the presence of armed conflict in 4 or more 
bordering countries, and state-led discrimination, are able to accurately predict 
whether or not a civil war will break out in over 80% of the cases tested, with 
regime type being the most powerful predictor. Their methodology is more 
precisely tuned to forecasting rare events in cases where confounding variables 
are highly likely to be present, and the utilize a more practical, machine learning 
oriented test for evaluating their models. Rather than evaluating these models 
based mainly on R² values and measures of statistical significance (although the 
latter is present and considered), the authors test their models on randomly 
selected sample data not used in its construction. However, the authors do note 
that evaluating models based on predictive power is fundamentally different than 
evaluating them on fit, and thus not comparable in a strict sense. In the end, they 
conclude that regime type is the most powerful predictor of civil war onset (in 
addition to other forms of political instability), and that other political and social 
variables become almost insignificant when regime type is taken into account. 
 Buhaug et al are also critical of Collier and Hoeffler, and assert that prior 
measures of economic and ethnic fractionalization, such as the Gini coefficient 
and Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization metric, do not effectively capture the 
underlying causes of economic and ethnic exclusion and thus may create 
                                                          
10 Goldstone et al, “A Global Model”, 190. 
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unreliable models11. The authors posit that economic inequality as measured by 
the Gini coefficient is useful primarily for evaluating economic inequality 
between individuals (termed vertical inequality), rather than inequality between 
groups as a whole (horizontal inequality). As civil wars are waged by groups 
acting collectively rather than individuals, horizontal inequality is seen as a more 
appropriate indicator for studying their outbreak than vertical inequality. They 
also maintain that there are several types of intrastate conflict: ethnically based 
territorial, ethnically based governmental conflict, and non-ethnic conflict. The 
authors find that separating the three conflict types, utilizing their higher-level 
group based indicators of economic inequality, and focusing primarily on the size 
of the largest oppressed group as a fraction of the total country population, it is 
clear ethnic groups which are far poorer than the national average for a group are 
more likely to trigger ethnic based territorial conflict, and that the presence of a 
large, oppressed ethnic group is more likely to lead to ethnically based 
governmental conflict. 
 Fearon and Laitin fall somewhat outside the greed versus grievance 
debate. Their 2003 paper, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”12, has proved to 
be almost as influential and Collier and Hoeffler’s, and maintains certain criteria, 
such as a poverty, rugged terrain, and a weak central government, are conditions 
highly favorable to rebellion, and their presence increases the likelihood of civil 
war outbreak. They find that these variables are also far better predictors of civil 
                                                          
11 Halvard Buhaug, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. "Square pegs in round 
holes: Inequalities, grievances, and civil war." International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 2 (2014), 
418. 
12 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity”, 75. 
7 
 
war outbreak than state discrimination, ethnic and religious tension, and economic 
inequality. The authors note that conditions that make it easier for rebels to hide 
from government forces (the conditions that favor civil war outbreak) make it 
possible for a small group of committed rebels to wage a sustained campaign 
against a larger government, and make it more difficult to stop a potential rebel 
group. 
 Fearon and Laitin’s findings are supported by Reagan and Norton13. In 
“Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars”, they argue that political 
grievance is what initiates civil wars, but that economic motivations become more 
important for the movement to remain viable. Similar to what Fearon and Laitin 
propose, they also find that a government’s ability to react more effectively to 
lower level forms of political instability decreases the likelihood of civil war 
breaking out. Finally, they find that in order to be effective means of funding a 
rebellion, natural resources must be easily lootable, transportable, and saleable for 
a rebel group. This means resources that require a great deal of infrastructure to 
extract or are very large and cumbersome, such as timber and oil, are not 
especially useful to rebel groups as a source of funding, while resources such as 
precious stones and especially drugs are much more viable. 
 Hegre and Sambanis find a variety of significant relationships in their 
2006 study “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset”, many 
                                                          
13 Patrick M. Regan, and Daniel Norton. "Greed, grievance, and mobilization in civil wars." 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 3 (2005), 319. 
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of which support a generally economic impetus for civil war14. They find that 
countries with a large population, low per capita GDP, and sluggish annual GDP 
growth are more likely to experience civil war, which is consistent with the bulk 
of the civil war literature. However, they also find support for Fearon and Laitin’s 
assertion that rough terrain and state capacity (here represented as military size) 
increase the likelihood of civil war. In addition, they find that being located in a 
region with many other states that have experienced recent warfare and are 
generally undemocratic also increases the likelihood. 
 Ward et al set the stage for later discussion of the use of machine learning 
methodologies in the study of civil wars with their critique of what they saw as 
the over-reliance on descriptive statistics and statistical significance in the field15. 
They maintain that previous researchers had focused too much on analyzing the 
statistical significance of the variables they had available, rather than finding or 
engineering more useful variables, similar to what Buhaug et al did. They argue 
that both Fearon and Laitin and Collier and Hoeffler’s models lack predictive 
power, and that while they were created to be descriptive, not predictive, this fact 
alone does not make them better models or better indicators of the true causes of 
civil war (it should be noted that when tested for their predictive power, Collier 
and Hoeffler’s model is a better predictor). The authors close by warning that 
basing policy on models that have been constructed primarily to be explanatory 
and to find statistically significant variables is likely to have undesirable 
                                                          
14 Havard Hegre, and Nicholas Sambanis. "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War 
Onset." Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 4 (August 2006), 508. 
15 Ward, “Perils”, 363. 
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outcomes and should be avoided, and that further research should be more aware 
of the predictive power of the models and place less emphasis on finding the 
highest p-value.  
 As stated above, work on using machine learning methods to forecast civil 
war is a developing field. All of the papers previously described, with the 
exception of Goldstone et al, have used fairly standard social science statistics as 
their primary methodologies, primarily logistic regression in this area. This is 
certainly a useful explanatory tool when examining the underlying causes of 
political phenomena, it does not fit the need for a reliable way of detecting 
potential conflicts early and reacting to them. The subsequent works deal with this 
topic in more detail. 
 In “Machine Learning and Conflict Prevention: A Use Case”, Perry 
examines the practical utility of machine learning methods for predicting the 
outbreak of conflict16. Using data covering Africa at the subnational level 
(provinces and cities), the variables used to construct the models are GDP, 
population, the presence of diamonds and petroleum deposits, and the percentage 
of children who are underweight. Several models were conducted using the naïve 
Bayes and random forest algorithms. The first two models used only previous 
incidence of battles as input variables, while the second two used the full dataset. 
Finally, a random forest model was conducted to predict the number of battles in 
a given area. The classification models exhibit high overall accuracy, which is 
                                                          
16 Perry, “Machine Learning”, 1-17. 
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unsurprising. The actual occurrence of a battle is rare, and thus it seems intuitive 
that the model would correctly predict the majority of cases correctly simply by 
predicting false in virtually all cases. The author concludes by noting that this new 
capability represents a step forward for policy makers, and that while his models 
may not seem to be groundbreaking, the capability the use is. He outlines five 
steps forward, which are as follows: examine whether a more localized or more 
global scope is better for the task, look into newer tools for building larger 
versions of these models at faster speeds, such as cloud computing and parallel 
processing, examine the effect of time on the predictive power of the models in a 
more systematic and robust way, locate better data for the construction of future 
models, and create a more detailed outcome categorization that goes beyond a 
simple binary indicator of whether or not a battle happened or a straight count of 
the number of battles which occurred.  
 Muchlinski et al compare the predictive power of several different forms 
of logistic regression (L1-regularized, Rare Events, and traditional logistic 
regression) to that of random forest models17. The authors here advocate using 
cross-validation in the construction and evaluation of a model. This consists of 
shuffling the dataset and iteratively reconstructing the model using different folds 
of the data, so that each observation is used both as data used to construct the 
model and used to test the model at different times18. The overall evaluation 
                                                          
17 Muchlinski, “Comparing Random Forest”, 87-103. 
18 Colaresi, Michael, and Zuhaib Mahmood. "Do the robot: Lessons from machine learning to 
improve conflict forecasting." Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 2 (2017), 193-214. also 
advocate for cross-validation and an iterative framework for constructing predictive models. 
While their framework is somewhat intuitive (use domain expertise to select model parameters, 
construct the model, test it against existing data, evaluate flaws, then use domain expertise to 
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metric of the model is an aggregation of the different times the model was run. 
Utilizing this technique for the three types of logistic regression and the random 
forest model, the researchers find that the random forest model is far better at 
predicting whether or not a civil war will break out. It is also worth noting that the 
least powerful predictor variable in the random forest model is primary 
commodity exports, while the most powerful are GDP growth and GDP per 
capita. The authors conclude that random forests appear to be a much more 
accurate predictor than logistic regression, but note that logistic regression may 
prove superior in cases where the relationship between independent and 
dependent variables is more linear.   
 Reviewing the existing literature reveals that there is an apparent hole in 
the research currently being conducted into civil wars. Previous research has 
relied primarily on using descriptive statistics to find statistically significant 
variables in explanatory models, and the existing research on predictive models is 
rather sparse. In addition, the research into predictive models seems to have been 
primarily utilized random forests, which are only one algorithm in the machine 
learning toolbox. This study will attempt to address this gap by utilizing different 
algorithms, and evaluating their power against both random forests and logistic 
regression. 
                                                          
attempt to address these flaws and go through the process again), it runs counter to the more p-
value driven process typically used in the social sciences. It has not been elaborated on it in 
more detail because it is so intuitive, but it is worth noting that developing a standard workflow 
and advocating for the use of cross-validation is still seen as being necessary in this sub-field as 
recently as 2017. 
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3. Data and Methods 
The goal of this study is to test how well previous research fares in predicting 
civil war outbreak, particularly when tree-based non-parametric models were 
used. This study tests six predictive algorithms: logistic regression, random 
forests, boosted classification trees, bagged classification trees, stochastic gradient 
boosting, and extreme gradient boosting. Of these, logistic regression is the only 
parametric model. Data utilized are the same data used by Hegre & Sambanis19 
and Muchlinski et. al20. The data is recorded for every formally recognized 
country in the world for each year, 1945-2000. The outcome variable (the variable 
to be predicted) is whether or not a civil war incident occurred in that year. An 
incident of civil war in this dataset is defined as a conflict between at least two 
intrastate actors that results in at least 1000 battle deaths within the year. Models 
in this dataset were constructed in R using the Caret machine learning library. K-
fold cross validation with 10 folds was utilized. 
 Civil war is a very rare event, and as a result these data are highly 
unbalance (roughly 1% of the observations in the dataset experienced civil wars). 
In order to correct for this, four different sampling methods were tests: down-
sampling and up-sampling, which are bootstrap methods which under-sample the 
most common class and over-sample the uncommon class, and the ensemble 
                                                          
19 Hegre and Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis”, 508. 
20 Muchlinski, “Comparing Random Forest”, 4-5. 
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sampling methods of Synthetic Minority Over-Sampling Technique (SMOTE)21 
and Random Over-Sampling Examples (ROSE)22, both of which generate 
additional positive class examples algorithmically. Each model was also run with 
no sampling for a baseline. 
 In machine learning, there are several different metrics which can be used 
to assess the performance. Metric selection is a highly subjective process, and is 
extremely dependent on the purpose of the model. This study relies upon three 
metrics, those of the Area Under the Curve (AUC), Sensitivity, and Specificity. 
The area under the curve plots the true positive rate (in this case incidents of war 
correctly classified as such by the model) against the false positive rate (incidents 
of war classified as incidents of peace), and calculates the area underneath 
ranging from 0-1. Evaluating the AUC score is extremely similar to traditional 
academic grades, with .9 – 1 being a very powerful model, .8-.89 being a good 
model, 0.7-0.79 being a fair model, 0.6 – 0.69 being a weak model, and anything 
lower being useless model. Sensitivity is the percentage of the positive class (here 
an incident of civil war) correctly predicted and specificity is the percentage of 
the negative class (here peace) correctly predicted. 
It should be mentioned at this point that this study is an extension of the work 
done by Muchlinski et al. While their study only compared logistic regression to 
                                                          
21 Nitesh V. Chawla, Kevin W. Bowyer, Lawrence O. Hall, and W. Philip Kegelmeyer. "SMOTE: 
synthetic minority over-sampling technique." Journal of artificial intelligence research 16 (2002), 
321-357. 
22 Menardi, Giovanna, and Nicola Torelli. "Training and assessing classification rules with 
imbalanced data." Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery (2014), 10. 
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random forests23, this study attempts to go further at test a variety of tree-based 
algorithms. Their study also utilized down-sampling only the case of their final 
model, not for every model constructed, and does not test various sampling 
methods. Finally, Muchlinski et al construct their models using peace as the 
positive class (the class the model is trying to predict)24. 
 In order to gain a general understand of which type of variables were the 
best predictors in isolation, models were constructed using only variables in each 
of the following categories: economic, governmental, demographic, and 
developmental. Economic variables included GDP per capita, GDP growth, 
primary commodity exports as a percentage of GDP, etc. Governmental variables 
included regime type, military manpower, and regime durability among others. 
Demographic variables included ethnic and religious fractionalization, while 
developmental variables included things such as infant mortality rate and literacy 
rate. The specific variables for each model are listed below 
Fearon & Laitin25: History of Conflict, Log Population, Log GDP, 
Rough Terrain, Noncontiguous, Oil Exports (% 
GDP), New State, Political Instability, Polity IV 
Score, Ethnic Fractionalization, Religious 
Fractionalization 
Collier & Hoeffler26: Primary Commodity Exports (% GDP) 
Squared, Log GDP, Annual Change in GDP, 
History of Conflict, Rough Terrain, Ethnic 
Fractionalization, Population Density, Log 
                                                          
23 Muchlinski, “Comparing Random Forest”, 1. 
24 This is a rather subtle error to spot, and is a bug in the authors’ code resulting from a somewhat 
strange way the Caret library for R handles classes. Without specification, it takes the level with 
either the lowest number of the first letter as the positive class. 
25 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity”, 84. 
26 Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance”, 573. 
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Population, Cold War Era, Secondary 
Education Rate 
Hegre & Sambanis27: Log Population, Log GDP, Political 
Instability, Regulation of Political 
Participation, Middle East or North Africa, 
Durability Metric, GDP Growth, Anocracy, 
Partial Freedoms, Neighbor at War, Rough 
Terrain, Polity IV Score Squared, New State, 
Median Regional Polity Score (Polity II), 
Ethnic Dominance Metric, Military Size 
(Personnel), Western Europe or US, Number 
of Neighbors at War, Presidential System 
Economic: Agriculture Exports (% GDP), Exports (% GDP), Oil 
and Fuel Exports (% of Material Exports), Annual GDP 
Growth, Manufactured Exports (% of Material Exports), 
Average Neighbor Log GDP per Capita, Oil (% of 
GDP), Primary Commodity Exports (% GDP) Squared, 
Trade (% GDP) 
Governmental: Regime Age, Anocracy, Size of Government Army 
(1985), Autocracy Score, Annual Change, 
Autocracy Index (Polity IV), de Facto 
Autonomous Regions, Centralized State (Polity 
III), Democracy Index (Polity IV), Democracy 
Index Change (Polity 98), Regime Durability, 
Federal State (Polity III), Regime Type, Incumbent 
Advantage, Majoritarian System, Military Size 
(Personnel), Polity Type, Neighbors’ Median 
Polity Index (Polity II), New State, Annual Polity 
Change, Competitiveness of Political Participation 
for Non-Elites, Regulation of Political 
Participation, Log of Voting Population to 
Opposition’s Share of Votes Cast, Partially Free 
Polity, Polity IV Index, Polity Change (Polity 98), 
Political Competition (Polity IV), Presidential 
System, Median Regional Polity (Polity II), Semi-
Federal State (Polity III) 
Demographic: Linguistic Heterogeneity, Racial Heterogeneity, 
Religious Heterogeneity, Ethnic Fractionalization, 
Ethnic Heterogeneity, Ethnolinguistic Diversity, 
Ethnic Dominance Metric, Number of Linguistic 
Groups, Population Share of Largest Ethnic Group, 
                                                          
27 Hegre and Sambanis, “Sensitivity Analysis”, 528. 
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Religious Fractionalization, Percent of Population 
in Second Largest Ethnic Group 
Development: Illiteracy Rate, Infant Mortality Rate, Life 
Expectancy, Primary School Enrollment, 















Economic 0.8157 0.7841 0.7375 
Governmental 0.6846 0.4553 0.6279 
Demographic 0.6144 0.4477 0.6226 
Developmental 0.6748 0.4492 0.6846 
Economic 0.9196 0.6909 0.9093 
Governmental 0.8212 0.2636 0.8982 
Demographic 0.6978 0.4076 0.8643 
Developmental 0.8449 0.6227 0.875 
Economic 0.9188 0.2492 0.1492 
Governmental 0.8423 0.2053 0.2544 
Demographic 0.7525 0.3977 0.3203 
Developmental 0.8792 0.275 0.2081 
Economic 0.8617 0.653 0.8955 
Governmental 0.7363 0.2712 0.8556 
Demographic 0.6593 0.422 0.8515 
Developmental 0.797 0.6121 0.8451 
Economic 0.9011 0.8008 0.8068 
Governmental 0.8474 0.5159 0.8483 
Demographic 0.7655 0.4424 0.7608 
Developmental 0.8663 0.7068 0.8215 
Economic 0.9219 0.6636 0.9006 
Governmental 0.8451 0.5333 0.8776 
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Demographic 0.7735 0.5068 0.8358 
Developmental 0.8781 0.7341 0.796 
 
Figure 1 
As can be seen here, economic variables are the strongest predictor, 
followed by governmental and developmental. Demographic variables are the 
weakest predictor. This generally lends support to Collier & Hoeffler’s assertion 
that economic issues drive civil war28. However, it is important to note that 
prediction is fundamentally different from explanation, and it is not wise to draw 
conclusions about underlying cause from predictive models. It should also be 
noted that highest median specificity, meaning the percentage of wars correctly 
predicted, belongs to logistic regressions constructed with economic variables. 
However, an important caveat is that in some cases, models may predict a single 
class for every observation, and thus it is important to take all the metrics into 
account. A model that predicts a civil war will break out in every country every 
year will predict all civil wars, but clearly as useless as a model that predicts civil 
wars will never break out anywhere. This table also shows the power of tree-
                                                          
28 Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance”, 595. 
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based models compared to logistic regression, which performs worse for every 
model. 
Figure 2 
It is also important to note that Demographic variables are the worst 
category of predictor variables on their own. This shows that ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic fractionalization alone are not enough to accurately predict civil war 
outbreak. Similarly, while performing a good deal better than Demographic 
variables, Governmental variables perform significantly worse than Economic 
variables, and are also not a powerful predictor of civil war outbreak on their own. 
Finally, the second most powerful category, Developmental, may be intuitively 
understood to be related to economic development (typically a wealth nation will 
not have a high infant mortality rate or a large portion of its population that 
cannot read).  
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 The second step in the process was to test the variables utilized by 
previous scholarship to see how well they performed with different algorithms. 
The previous models tested were those constructed by Fearon & Laitin, Collier & 




Algorithm Previous Model Median AUC Median Sensitivity Median Specificity
Fearon & Laitin 0.7634 0.5856 0.726
Collier & Hoeffler 0.822 0.6985 0.7575
Hegre & Sambanis 0.7947 0.6394 0.7327
Fearon & Laitin 0.7479 0.1432 0.9524
Collier & Hoeffler 0.9133 0.725 0.9008
Hegre & Sambanis 0.8666 0.4568 0.9095
Fearon & Laitin 0.7697 0.309 0.2972
Collier & Hoeffler 0.9276 0.2864 0.1511
Hegre & Sambanis 0.8784 0.4167 0.1439
Fearon & Laitin 0.7023 0.0848 0.9741
Collier & Hoeffler 0.8486 0.7182 0.8971
Hegre & Sambanis 0.7674 0.5689 0.874
Fearon & Laitin 0.7789 0.5523 0.793
Collier & Hoeffler 0.922 0.7742 0.8914
Hegre & Sambanis 0.8659 0.7235 0.8354
Fearon & Laitin 0.7766 0.4735 0.8256
Collier & Hoeffler 0.9297 0.8106 0.8824











Here, we can see that Collier & Hoeffler’s model has a great deal of predictive 
power, while Fearon and Laitin’s has the least. Overall, variables selected by Collier & 
Hoeffler used with extreme gradient boosted trees have the highest median AUC at 
0.9207 and the highest sensitivity with 81.06% of war incidents predicted correctly. The 
specificity (the number of peace years correctly predicted to be peaceful) is also very 
high, at 88.24% correct. 
Examining the results shows that a few algorithms truly lag behind in terms of 
predictive power. Overall the algorithm that made the strongest predictions was Extreme 
Gradient Boosting, and the least powerful was Logistic Regression. Extreme Gradient 
Boosting, Boosted Classification Trees, and Stochastic Gradient Boosting all performed 
comparably, with Random Forests lagging slightly behind and Bagged Trees following 








 Sampling methods were also an area investigated by this study, as stated 
above. To reiterate, the sampling methods used were up-sampling (sampling 
examples of the positive class multiple times to increase its effect on the model), 
down-sampling (leaving out samples of the negative class to decrease its effect 
relative to positive examples), SMOTE and ROSE (ensemble methods which 
algorithmically generate new examples of  
Figure 7 
the positive class based on the mathematical properties of existing samples). 
Overall, all sampling methods performed relatively consistently, with ROSE 
being the only metric that did worse that the control group that used no sampling. 
Down-sampling performed the best overall, but does not appear in the top ten 
models by AUC, and only marginally outperformed SMOTE, which does appear 





The ten models with the highest AUC are shown above. While the 
Extreme Gradient Boosted Collier and Hoeffler model with no sampling has the 
highest AUC at .9356, it is important to note that the specificity of the model is 
low, meaning it is likely to under-predict civil war outbreak. While it is possible 
to argue otherwise, it seems that the Extreme Gradient Boosted Collier and 
Hoeffler model that utilized SMOTE sampling is the most powerful model all 
around, as it boasts an AUC of over .9, a sensitivity of 0.8106 and a specificity of 
0.8824. It should also be noted here that eight out of ten of the models that appear 
on this are Collier and Hoeffler, and the other two use only economic variables. 
Additionally, the algorithm that appears most often is Extreme Gradient Boosting, 
with random forests (the method utilized by Muchlinski et al) only appearing 
twice, and the first appearance under-predicting incidents of civil war.   
As can be seen in the scatter plots below, when comparing models of each 
category, Collier & Hoeffler and Economic are the front-runners in this area as 
well. Points which appear closest to the upper-right corner have the highest 
combination of sensitivity and specificity. As was stated above, developmental 
Type Model Sampling AUC Sensitivity Specificity
Extreme Gradient Boosting Collier & Hoeffler None 0.9356 0.2409 0.9976
Boosted Trees Collier & Hoeffler Up 0.9337 0.2864 0.1081
Stochastic Gradient Boosting Collier & Hoeffler SMOTE 0.932 0.7742 0.8914
Random Forest Economic None 0.9314 0.1992 0.999
Extreme Gradient Boosting Collier & Hoeffler SMOTE 0.9309 0.8106 0.8824
Extreme Gradient Boosting Collier & Hoeffler Up 0.9297 0.5689 0.9647
Boosted Trees Collier & Hoeffler None 0.9281 0.7992 0.0021
Random Forest Collier & Hoeffler SMOTE 0.9279 0.725 0.9008
Boosted Trees Collier & Hoeffler SMOTE 0.9276 0.1727 0.1511
Extreme Gradient Boosting Economic None 0.9271 0.2583 0.9989
24 
 
variables come second for the variable type models. While they do perform 
slightly less well than economic variables, it is important to note that there are 




The results of this study indicate three things: non-parametric tree-based models 
perform significantly better in predicting civil war outbreak than logistic 
regression and more nuanced ensemble methods perform the best of those tree-
based models, economic variables generally and Collier & Hoeffler’s economic 
based model specifically are generally better predictors of civil war outbreak, and 
ROSE sampling is highly ineffective for prediction of this topic, while all other 
sampling methods performed comparably. 
It is perhaps unsurprising that civil war is predicted better by models which are 
not strictly linear. However, this study has demonstrated just how large the gap is 
in this case, and also has significant implications for future research. While this 
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study does not claim to provide any explanation as to the causes of civil war, it 
does suggest that expanding statistical techniques beyond parametric techniques 
can yield strong results. It seems plausible that future studies with the goal of 
explanation may do well to utilize tree regression rather than linear regression to 
yield more robust results. Similarly, it is simply not enough to rely on the Random 
Forest algorithm to outperform logistic regression, as it was routinely 
outperformed by Extreme Gradient Boosting and Stochastic Gradient Boosting. 
 As to the second conclusion of this study, it appears that, whatever the 
underlying cause of civil war, economic condition is the most powerful predictor 
of whether one will erupt in a given country during a given year. Using only 
economic variables, it is possible to construct a model with an AUC of greater 
than .9, which, as stated above, is quite a powerful model. Additionally, the 
previous work by Collier & Hoeffler turns out to have a great deal of predictive 
power, dominating the top ten most powerful models by AUC and in some cases 
having greater than .8 sensitivity and specificity simultaneously. While it may be 
possible to push the performance ceiling even higher using feature engineering or 
dimensionality reduction, this model performs extraordinarily well as it stands. 
This also demonstrates that previous, explanation-driven scholarship is useful in 
more prediction oriented research. 
 Regarding the issue of sampling, it seems surprising that models which 
use no sampling at all should outperform any sampling method, given the extreme 
imbalance in this dataset. This one example is certainly not enough to disregard to 
the ROSE sampling method entirely. However, future research may be needed to 
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investigate its practical utility in the world of predictive modeling in political 
science.  
 As has been hinted, this study contains a number of interesting avenues for 
future research. The first and largest is the usefulness of artificial neural networks 
for predicting civil war. While these methods are computationally intensive, it is 
quite possibly the case they perform strongly enough that the trade-off is worth 
the increase in complexity and computational intensity. In a similar vein, 
dimensionality reduction and feature engineering should be investigated as a 
possible means of improving the ability to predict intrastate conflict. Finally, a 
thorough test of ROSE sampling across a number of topics in political science and 
specifically comparative politics could help in determining whether the method 
has any utility in this discipline. Given how frequently imbalanced data present 
themselves in political research, it will always be useful to have more ways of 
dealing with this imbalance. However, the poor performance of this sampling 
method in this study would seem to indicate there are areas in which it simply is 
not suited. 
 Ideally the techniques investigated in this study will help to create more 
robust early warning systems for civil conflict and be helpful in crafting policy to 
increase stability and reduce violence throughout the world. While the use of 
machine learning for public policy is still in its infancy, it shows a great deal of 
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